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Can we observe public attitudes using social media data? Or more concretely, can we 
disregard polls as the preferred method for observing public opinion? Our 
comparison between public opinion survey data and Twitter data from the 2013 
Chilean presidential election shows a nuanced picture. We use social network analysis 
to estimate political positions of Twitter users and estimate their sentiment towards 
public issues based on their public tweets. We work with the public opinion data from 
the Chilean CEP survey to compare the Twitter data to the polls. Our focus is on the 
relationship between political position Ȅ proxied by their support for a candidate Ȅ 
and their views about given relevant political topics. The results show that, in most 
cases, support for certain policies has a correlate in the online world, with a positive 
tone of tweets. However, there are some interesting differences among supporters of 
various candidates. Those who support the leading candidate tend to tweet with a 
more positive tone, regardless of the issue. On the other hand, supporters of other 
candidates are less likely to tweet with a positive tone, even when it is about a topic 
they support. These findings show that Twitter data can provide interesting insight 
about how people frame political discussions, depending on the electoral viability of 
the candidate they support. 
KeywordsȄ political position estimation, social media, network homophily, electoral 
viability 
Introduction 
Monitoring and using social media to understand Ȅ or influence Ȅ public opinion is 
not a new thing. Companies, political parties and organisations alike are keen to 
observe what their followers say, what people are commenting on their Facebook 
pages, and what is said in the comments sections of Youtube and Instagram. 
Moreover, a great deal of work has been done in building social media teams in charge 
of both engaging and analysing what people exchange through these platforms. To 
some extent, these phenomena have questioned whether traditional, more expensive, 
ways to observe public opinion are still required. The regular route for understanding 
public opinion, both at the consumer and the political levels, relies heavily on surveys. 
These instruments present their own advantages depending on the scope of the 
research. Moreover, they enjoy a fair amount of validity among the scientific 
community as proper instruments to analyse public attitudes. 
Twitter, on the other hand, has been widely contested by the academic community as 
a valid way to analyse public attitudes and behaviour. Different attempts to predict 
election outcomes from Twitter have failed, and scholars (Gayo-Avello 2012; DiGrazia 
et al. 2013) have argued about the usefulness of social media data to understand 
large-scale political events. The same has been argued in relation to other events, such 
as the Eurovision contest or popular TV Shows (e.g. The X Factor show). The 
underlying consensus is that Twitter does not present the conditions required by 
traditional research approaches to produce accurate forecasts. Hence, some recent 
attempts have pursued a different route: comparing Twitter data to opinion polls. 
Some recent efforts (e.g. Beauchamp 2013)    ǯ 
ratings by matching them with Twitter data from the previous period. In that way, the 
goal is no longer in predicting elections (that is left to opinion polls), but to analyse 
how close are the discussions on Twitter to more valid representations of public 
opinion. 
This chapter aims to expand this line of research by using two different strategies. On 
the one hand, we use retweet networks to estimate the political position of Twitter 
users. Second, we take the content of the tweets from those users to compare their 
views on different topics with data from public opinion surveys. Scholars 
(Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008; Bartels 2010; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 
2012) have already established the presence of a relationship between political 
positions and attitudes towards public issues, such as equal marriage and the electoral 
system. We use the estimation from Twitter data to compare the results with opinion 
polls and provide a more informed picture of when, if possible, social media can 
substitute or complement them. 
We use data from Chile for 2013, focusing in the period before the presidential 
election. The Twitter data was gathered from 17 September to 17th December of 2013 
using the Twitter public streaming API. Survey data, on the other hand, comes from a 
mainstream source in Chile: The seasonal survey from the Centro de Estudios Públicos 
(CEP). We discuss the validity issues of each source and the strategy to assess their 
accuracy. 
Our results show that, according to the expectations, Twitter data is still not 
appropriate for substituting opinion polls. However, there is an interesting story to be 
told in relation to candidate support and tone. In the Chilean case, the supporters of 
the leading candidate, and later President, Michelle Bachelet, are more likely to 
express their views on Twitter with a positive tone. Moreover, when the support for 
Bachelet predicts significantly the support for certain policies (according to survey 
data), there is a correspondence in the positive tone of the tweets from her Twitter 
supporters. This is something that does not happen in the case of those who support 
other candidates. In other cases, we see supporters that tend to be less likely to use a 
positive tone on their tweets, even when survey data says that, on average, they 
support the policies that are talking about. This is consistent on our hypothesis that 
electoral viability is related to higher likelihood of a positive tone in the tweets. 
This chapter will go as follows. First, we discuss the literature on opinion formation 
and the role of political position. Then, we move into the discussion of using social 
media data to forecast political events and understand public attitudes. This is 
followed by a discussion of the Chilean case and the elements of electoral viability. We 
then explain the methods used to estimate political positions and filter the relevant 
topics. The results are presented to demonstrate how we derive the conclusions 
stated above. In our discussion, we extrapolate from these results to make a 
compelling case of how much researchers should rely on these sources and what is 
the actual potential of new media for valid academic research. 
Literature Review 
Ideology and Public Opinion 
Political ideology is relevant for public opinion. This is a bold statement, but not 
unjustified. Zaller argued in 1992 in his well-known RAS model that people who are 
more politically aware tend to have more stable and defined attitudes. For Zaller, 
ideology was a product of this awareness. The more aware a person is, the more 
stable are their ideological positions. Then, people with more defined ideology or 
systems of belief will look for information from partisan voices. That is, liberals will 
search for opinions from liberal elites, and will reinforce their own liberal views. This 
will reflect on preferences for public policies (such as redistribution or welfare in the 
case of liberals), and approval ratings. Conversely, Zaller claims that less aware people 
have also less stable ideological posǤ  ǡ     ǲǳǤǡ 
attitudes. 
The empirical evidence supports this view. For example, Bartels (2005) studies how 
views on tax reform in the US are explained by ideology and levels of education. 
Converse (1975) makes a similar case in relation with voting behaviour, while Dalton  
(2000) analyses the role of party identification (usually used as a measure for  Ȍ  ǯ litics. Outside the US, there is growing body of 
literature on the topic. López-Sáez & Martínez-Rubio (2005) explain how ideological 
positions change the level of credibility in governmental information. Based on the 
case of the 11-M terrorist attacks in Madrid, they found that right-wing people 
believed that their voting behaviour had been affected more by official information, 
while left-wing respondents were more influenced by unofficial information.  ǯ   ǡ ǡ mely relevant to understand 
political attitudes. Traditional measures have relied on survey questions where 
people can position themselves in 1-10 (or 1-7) scales, indicate their preferences for 
the existing political parties, or self-identify as liberals or conservatives. The validity 
of each of these measures has been widely discussed (see discussion on Ansolabehere 
and Hersh 2012) and is usually dependent on the political system of each country. In 
multiparty systems, measures of left-right scale might be an over-reduction of the 
complexity in which people can position politically. Accordingly, countries with two-
party systems are more suitable for such scales. In the case of Chile Ȅ the case under 
study Ȅ the presence of two big coalitions for the last 20 years allows us to use 
methods that are similar to two-party systems. 
Using Social media for forecasting elections and understanding 
public attitudes   ǯ        ǡ 
events has become an attractive topic. Nowadays, we can find statistical models to 
predict the outcome of the Fifa World Cup, the winner of the Eurovision contest, or the 
next armed conflict in the world. With unequal results, the advancements of 
forecasting models rely heavily on the quality of the information they use to base their 
predictions. For examples, attempts to produce similar election forecasts in Chile 
(Bunker n.d.) have failed, mainly due to the inability of pollsters to estimate turnout. 
Similar situations can be observed in other Latin American countries, where the low 
quality of survey data produces bad forecasts. 
A similar discussion has been taking place in academic spheres studying social media. 
Daniel Gayo-ǯ(2012) now-seminal piece on the topic explained, in a very crude 
way, why most attempts to provide electoral predictions using Twitter have failed. In 
Gayo-ǯǡǡ
models against past events (he calls them post-hoc analysis). This practice creates a ǲǳǡ
results would actually fit with future events. Another criticism is that there is no 
clarity on how to equate tweets to votes. In that regards, a recent study (DiGrazia et al. 
2013) attempted to correlate the raw count of tweets with the raw count of votes, 
although this approach has been heavily questioned for its validity. In general, 
criticisms about prediction attempts are wide and well-grounded. 
The field has now started to move away from electoral outcomes to compare Twitter 
data with some indicators from public opinion surveys. The substantive grounds for 
the move are clear. The same as responses in a survey, tweets can be understood as 
public expressions of private attitudes. On the other hand, voting is a different kind of 
action, more complex, which is constituted by a large array of preferences, attitudes 
and motivations. The relationship between tweets and survey responses, hence, is 
more justifiable and sensible. Both respond to a process of opinion formation and 
thus, can be compared as units of observation of a similar nature. 
On another note, information from Twitter is relevant as much as any other elite 
source is. As discussed ǡǯǯ
them at the moment they need to elicit a response. In that way, priming plays a 
significant effect. People can be primed by the media, through pundits, news and other 
means. But they can also use trusted sources of information, usually, elites. Elite ǡǯ
by reinforcing their preconceptions and affecting the level of salience of certain 
information. 
Nick Beauchamp (2013) has inaugurated the field by using Twitter data to observe 
how it can predict the popularity of different candidates in state-level surveys. His 
results show how can we use Twitter to interpolate the text from the tweets to ǯǤ
for cases when accurate polling data is not easily available. 
Our approach follows from this logic. If we approach tweets as expressions of 
personal attitudes, we can use them to understand key elements of public opinion. 
Moreover, there is more in Twitter than tweets. For example, Barberá (2015) has 
been successful ǯǤ
take a slightly different approach. As we explain below, instead of using following 
networks, we prefer retweets. We take advantage of the current research on the level 
of homophily of these networks (Lietz et al. 2014) to estimate the political position of 
those who participate in them. Our preference for retweet networks stems from the 
substantive difference between following someone and retweeting that person. 
Although both actions can be motivated by ironic or sarcastic motives, one is a one-off,      ȋȌǡ      ǯ   ǯ Ǥ        
statement, whatever that is. 
Another way to obtain public attitudes from social media is through text analysis. The 
use of text as data is a growing area of work in political research. From scaling text to 
obtain political positions (Lowe 2008; Lowe 2013; Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003) to 
the use of topic modeling ǯ
media , the field has grown significantly in the last decade. We are interested in a 
particular area, sentiment analysis. The purpose of this approach is to use semi-
automated methods to understand the polarity of certain sections of texts. By polarity, 
we mean the position of the text in terms of positive or negative dimensions. The use 
of sentiment analysis is also well documented (Godbole, Srinivasaiah, and Skiena 
2007; Pang and Lee 2008) and it has been applied to Twitter. 
This paper takes advantage of this literature and aims to advance it by looking beyond 
candidates. The field has been mildly obsessed with forecasting candidate support, 
while much has yet to be said about policy positions. 
The case of Chile in the context of electoral viability 
The 2013 presidential election in Chile was particularly different from previous ǡǯ ? ? ? ?Ǥ	ǡs the 
end of the first democratic right-wing government in over 50 years. President Piñǯ
administration had won the election in 2009, and was facing a difficult situation in 
terms of public approval. Moreover, his coalition suffered from the resignation of their 
candidate due to mental health concerns. A new candidate, Evelyn Matthei, former 
minister of Labour, had to take the role and agreed to compete. 
Second, the candidate from the left-wing coalition, Michelle Bachelet, was the front-
runner by a large margin. The CEP survey showed a support of 47%, while Ms Matthei, 
her closest contender, only reached 14%. Ms Bachelet left the Presidency in 2010 with 
arguably the highest appro   ǯ Ǥ hile she remained absent 
from Chilean politics, she was always in the lead of the opinion polls. 
Third, each sector had other interesting, yet unlikely-to-win candidates. On the one 
hand, former socialist Marco Enríquez-Ominami was pursuing the presidency for the 
second time, after obtaining a respectable 20% in 2009. In 2013, however, his share 
was half of that. From the right wing, an independent, Franco Parisi, was also gaining ǡǯǤ  ? ? ?ǡ
which is close to his final share in the election. 
Fourth, there was a group of 5 other candidates, which raised the number to 9, the   ǯ  Ǥ        ? ?    ǡ
nevertheless. 
We understand electoral viability as the perceived capability of a candidate of winning 
an election, and this is an attribute that only Michelle Bachelet had. According to the 
survey data from CEP, 78.2% of the respondents believed that Ms Bachelet would 
become the next president, while only 5.2% believed that Ms Matthei had a chance. 
None of the remaining 7 candidates got more than 1% of the mentions. In a scenario 
like this, the low level of competition should be reflected in the discussions among 
supporters of each candidate. That is, supporters of Michelle Bachelet should be more 
confident, and eventually more positive, when engaging in political discussions in the 
time prior to the election. There are no motives for them to engage in negativity. 
Hypotheses 
Based on the theory discussed above, we aim to test the following three hypotheses, 
Hypothesis 1: Consistent with the expectations of the literature, the share of 
supporters of each candidate on Twitter will not be useful to predict the actual share 
on the survey. 
The main argument in support of this hypothesis lays in the lack of probabilistic Ǥǯ
streaming API is a sample of 1% of the total, research (Morstatter et al. 2013) has 
shown that it does not consist in a probabilistic random sample. Any result we get 
from our estimation is likely to differ from the results of the opinion survey. 
Hypothesis 2: ǯ
tone when tweeting about political issues. 
This hypothesis stems from the electoral viability argument. Supporters of Bachelet 
are in no need to engage in violent, negative discussions on Twitter. They are the most 
likely winners of the forthcoming election, and even the supporters of the other 
candidates recognise that. 
Hypothesis 3: Where there is a statistically significant relationship in the survey data 
between supporting a candidate and supporting a given policy, that relationship is 
reflected in a higher probability of a positive tone on Twitter. 
This hypothesis consists on the idea that support for a policy can influence the way in 
which users who support the same candidate talk about the policy issue. We do not 
expect a significant difference among candidates, as the same argument should run for 
all of them. 
Data and Methods 
Data Sources  ǯǤ
one hand, during the second half of October 2013 (two weeks before the election), we 
collected twitter accounts who explicitly declared their intention to vote for a 
particular presidential candidate using hashtags with the following structure  ? ȋ ǲ    ǳȌ       
name of one of the four main candidates: Michelle Bachelet, Evelyn Matthei, Marco 
Enriquez and Franco Parisi. Each tweet contained all the relevant meta-data, such as 
location, URLs, date of creation and the users who tweeted them. This filter allowed us 
to identify the political preferences of 4,111 accounts. 
On the other hand, we collected tweets that were posted between the months of 
September to December 2013 in Chile using any of the following concepts that were 
relevant during the presidential campaign. Each of them were topics in which 
candidates showed polarized positiǣ   ȋǲ ǳǡǲ ?ǳȌǡ      ȋǲǳȌǡ  ȋǲǳȌǡ ȋǲǳǡ ǲǤ  ǳȌǡ   ȋǲȗǳǡǲ ?ǳȌǤd, we also included a search 
on a topic for which we do not expect polarized opinions based on political ǣȋǲǳȌǤ 
To guarantee that tweets were written in Chile we filtered the collected data by its 
location (either self reported location or geographical coordinates when they were 
available). By means of these filters we obtained 152,240 messages including tweets 
and  Ǥ 	ǡ         ǯ
accounts who retweeted messages from any of the politically identified users. This 
allowed us to expand the original dataset from 4,111 to 5,603 accounts. The steps 
followed to assign political preference to those retweeters are explained in the next 
subsection. 
The survey data comes from the quarterly survey from the Centro de Estudios 
Públicos (CEP), a recognised Chilean think tank. The survey was conducted during 
13th September and 14th October 2013. This is a nationally representative survey 
with a sample of 1,437 respondents. The margin of error is 3.0%. All calculations were 
conducted using the weighting instructions from CEP. 
We have chosen 5 different topics that were asked in the CEP survey as dependent 
variables: constitutional reform, equal marriage, electoral reform, abortion, and the 
ownership structure of the copper mines. Constitutional reform relates to a campaign 
started in 2013 to establish a constitutional assembly in the country. In the case of 
electoral reform, this refers mostly to the different attempts to change the way in 
which the members of Congress are elected. Equal marriage was a hot topic during the 
campaign, with most candidates supporting some sort of legal protection for same-sex 
couples. The case of abortion is particular, as Chile is one of the few countries in the 
world that does not allow abortion under any circumstances. As such, some of the 
candidates, including Bachelet, showed their support for allowing abortion under Ǥ	ǡǯ     
country. Prior to the dictatorship, all the operation of the mines was under the state-
owned company Codelco. There are some political actors (and some of the candidates) 
promoting that the state should re-gain control of the mines. 
Estimating political positions from Retweet Networks 
Let  represents a set of individuals who explicitly declared their intention to vote for 
some candidate in the set . Such that ୡ represents the subset of individuals in  
supporting a given candidate  B?  
Let  be the set of tweets written by individuals in  and ୡ be the subset of messages 
written by each individual  B? ୡ supporting the candidate  B? . 
Let  represent another set of individuals who have retweeted at least one message 
written by individuals in . Then, for each individual  B? , ୡ ൌ ሺୡሻ 
and ୲୭୲ୟ୪ ൌ ȭୡ 
Then, ୵ୡ ൌ ୡ୲୭୲ୟ୪ 
is the weight of individuals in ୡ within the set of individual ǯtweets. 
Finally, we defined ୮ as individual ǯǡ ୮ ൌ ሺ୵ୡሻȁ୮ ൐ ⁡?Ǥ⁡? 
Figure shows the results for  ൌ ǡǡ ǡ  and the data 
specified in the previous subsection. As shown, for all candidates and controversial 
issues retweeters predominantly retweet messages from individuals with political 
affinity giving support for the claim that retweeting on political issues is mostly a 
homophily-like behavior. 
Calculating the sentiment behind the tweets 
For the purpose of this exercise, we rely on an unsupervised method to calculate 
sentiment analysis. Unsupervised methods use several ways to compare the text with 
some baseline lexicons or dictionaries, and assigns scores to the different units of 
observations. 
In this case, we have used our own Spanish translation from the lexicon created by 
Wilson et al. (2005), and the sentiment R packages (Jurka 2012; Sajuria 2014). The 
original English lexicon uses a trained naive Bayes algorithm to classify the polarity of 
the words between negative and positive. Since this is a preliminary exercise, instead 
of re-training the algorithm, we use the voter algorithm. Each tweet is deconstructed 
into single words, and they are compared to the lexicon. The algorithm then counts 
the number of positives and negative words in each tweet. Whenever the majority of 
words are positive, the whole tweet is classified as such. The same procedure operates 
for words classified as negative. When the words that do not have a pre-set polarity 
are a majority, the algorithm classifies tweet as neutral. Subsequently, we created a ǲǳǡ ?
that tweet is such, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Figure 1: ǯ   r retweets by political affinity. The x-axis 
shows that there is a high homophily level on each of the retweet networks. 
Modelling support for candidates on tone and support for policies 
As Barberá (2015) explains, electoral support should be orthogonal to support on 
Twitter for a given candidate. However, we are departing from that discussion in two 
ways. First, we are looking at support for policies, which are not subject to a vote. 
Moreover, we aim to compare if the support for a candidate can be used as predictor 
for both support for a given policy, and the sentiment of those talking about that 
policy. Therefore, we need to estimate different models for each dataset. 
For the Twitter data, we model the positive tone of tweets about a given policy 
(), expressed as a dummy variable, as a function of the support for a given 
candidate (), the sex of the respondent (), and whether the respondent 
lives in Santiago or somewhere else in Chile (). The last two variables are 
traditional controls that can be used when understanding political support. We 
developed our own algorithm to detect the sex of the Twitter user and its location 
(when not geotagged). The link function is a logistic regression, and can be expressed 
as follows: ሺ ൌ ⁡?ሻ ൌ ଵଵାୣ୶୮ሺିஒబାஒభୡୟ୬ୢ୧ୢୟ୲ୣభାஒమୱୣ୶మାஒయୱୟ୬୲୧ୟ୥୭యା஫ሻ 
In the case of the survey data, the dependent variable changes for support () 
for a policy. The independent variables remain the same and the model has a similar 
expression, ሺ ൌ ⁡?ሻ ൌ ଵଵାୣ୶୮ሺିஒబାஒభୡୟ୬ୢ୧ୢୟ୲ୣభାஒమୱୣ୶మାஒయୱୟ୬୲୧ୟ୥୭యା஫ሻ 
In the case of each datasets, we estimated five models, one for each of the policies. The Ǯǯ     ? ǡ    
had 9. We are focusing on those who got the highest share on the first round: Michelle 
Bachelet (who went onto the run-off election and became finally elected), Evelyn 
Matthei (the other candidate that went onto the run-off election), Marco Enríquez-
Ominami, and Franco Parisi. Bachelet and Enríquez-Ominami are considered centre-
left/left wing candidates, while the other two are centre-right/right. Together, these 
four candidates obtained 92.82% of the votes during the first round of the 
presidential election. 
Results 
In relation to the share of supporters for each candidate, our estimation on Twitter 
should be independent to the support shown on the survey. Table 1 shows the 
identification or support for all the candidates included in our models per dataset. The 
results provide support for Hypothesis 1, as we can see no evident connection 
between the share of those who support any given candidate on the survey and those 
who we estimate on Twitter. 
 
Table 1: Support for candidates 
 Twitter CEP Survey 
Bachelet 39% 47% 
Matthei 4% 14% 
Enríquez-Ominami 32% 7% 
Parisi 17% 10% 
Table 2 shows the estimation results using the CEP survey dataset. In essence, we can 
observe that the support for certain candidates can act as a predictor of the support 
for certain reforms. In particular, the support for candidates (any) seems to be 
positively related with support for some of the policies. Women, on the other hand, 
tend to be more supportive of equal marriage than men, and less supportive of 
electoral reform. People living in Santiago are also more supportive of equal marriage, 
but have a negative likelihood to support abortion law, and transferring the 
ownership of the copper mines back to the State. 
In the case of the Twitter data, the picture looks a bit different. As explained above, 
our data does not come from a probabilistic sample. As such, the relevance of 
statistical significance is lower. Without a random sample, we cannot assume that our 
estimations will reflect the larger population of users on Twitter. Hence, we focus 
more on the direction of the coefficients, and less on the standard errors. The results 
shown in Table 3 express the coefficients from the logistic regression on the 
probability of a tweet having a positive tone. 
Table 2: Logistic regression using CEP survey data 
 As predicted, supporters of Michelle Bachelet are more likely to tweet with a positive 
tone on almost all the models. The only exception consists on the model about equal 
marriage. In the case of supporters for the other candidates, the tones differ across the 
models. Women are less likely to use a positive tone on every one of the topics than 
men, while people tweeting from Santiago are more likely to use a positive one. 
Table 4 shows no clear support for hypothesis 3. Only in the case of supporters of 
Michelle Bachelet there is a consistency between the support for an issue in the 
survey and the occurrence of a positive tone on Twitter. That is the case for the topics 
of electoral reform, abortion law, and the ownership of the copper mines. 
Interestingly, supporters of Mr Enríquez-Ominami show some decoupling on this 
regard. Their tone when discussing equal marriage, electoral reform or abortion is not 
positive, even when the survey data shows that, in average, they are more likely to 
support these issues. A similar case takes place among supporters of Matthei and 
electoral reform, and supporters of Parisi and constitutional reform. 
Table 3: Logistic regressions using Twitter data 
 Table 4: Comparison between support and positive tone 
Light grey: Increase in probability; Dark grey: Decrease in probability 
 Constitution Equal Marriage Electoral reform Abortion Law Copper owner 
 Survey Twitter Survey Twitter Survey Twitter Survey Twitter Survey Twitter 
Michelle 
Bachelet 
    *  *  *  




*  *  *  *  *  
Franco Parisi *    *  *    
Sex (women) *  *  *      
Location 
(Santiago) 
  *      *  
* p<0.05 (only for survey data).  
Discussion 
This exercise has been an attempt to expand the field of understanding public opinion 
through social media data. Much of the discussion has been exploring the notion that 
Twitter, and other social media, can be a useful Ȅ and cheaper Ȅ alternative to public 
opinion surveys. As shown above, there have been some attempts both to analyse 
Twitter data and compare it to polls. Our approach is an extension of that literature, 
by incorporating two new elements. On the one hand, we use an innovative way to 
estimate the political position of Twitter users, by looking at their support for 
candidates. On the other hand, we depart from the traditional question of relating 
candidate support on Twitter with similar indicators from surveys. We believe that, 
given the special nature of this social media platform Ȅ such as its non-representative 
population of users Ȅ support for a candidate on Twitter should be orthogonal to 
similar measures from probabilistic samples. Our results are an initial confirmation of 
that. 
Another contribution of this chapter comes from the notion of electoral viability. We 
have used that framework to propose that supporters of the leading candidate are 
more likely to use a positive tone on Twitter. Our results show a preliminary support 
for this, but they should be taken carefully. There are still some validation tests to 
perform, in order to provide error measurement to this relationship. However, this is 
a promising initial attempt. 
With regards to the comparison between survey and Twitter data, our results are 
inconclusive. The supporters of one particular candidate, Enríquez-Ominami, are less 
likely to use a positive tone on Twitter when discussing topics they support. This is 
surprising, and might reflect deeper dynamics of public discussion. An option for 
future research could be to focus on this particular case and understand what are the 
drivers of this phenomenon. One option is electoral viability Ȅ Enríquez-Ominami 
suffered throughout the campaign from a lack of momentum, especially compared to 
his performance in 2009 Ȅ as a driver of tone. However, given the impressive 
advantage that Ms Bachelet had on this regard, it becomes difficult to model this 
assertion with the data we have available. 
A word of caution should be given with regards to our estimation of political positions. 
As we have discussed before, there are other ways to estimate political positions of 
Twitter users that use followers-following relationships. We believe that there is 
something intrinsic in retweet networks that make them more useful in assessing if a 
given user holds a clear political position. While following another user is a rather 
costless and private act, retweeting is none of the above. However, we also know that 
revealed preferences are not necessarily the same as the real. As such, we still need to 
develop a way to test our estimations against well-respected procedures. 
Finally, sentiment analysis is not free from criticism. Machine learning processes, or 
even counting algorithms such as the one we use, are incapable of understanding 
sarcasm and irony. Furthermore, in the case of our paper, there are not many tools 
available to produce sentiment analysis in Spanish. Hence, the translation we 
produced for this chapter relies on the accuracy of the English lexicon. Further 
developments on this point would consist of training some sort of naive Bayesian 
classifier using only tweets in a language different than English. 
In summary, our goal is to propose new roads for future investigation, based on the 
notion that social media interactions can produce meaningful, complementary 
information to opinion polls. 
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